Why Automatic Exchange of Information matters
Increasing economic inequality and concentration of wealth across the globe is becoming widely recognised as a, if not the most important, problem of our time.
A wide spectrum of actors and organisations, including the World Economic Forum in Davos (Vanham, Peter 2017) , academics such as Piketty (Piketty 2014 ), charities such as Oxfam (Oxfam 2016) , the OECD (2015), the International Monetary Fund (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015) and the United Nations and its Sustainable Development Goals (High Level Panel 2013: 60) , have pointed out the risks and harms caused by current levels and dynamics in income and wealth inequality. These range from degrading the environment, reducing economic growth and increasing social exclusion to undermining fair market competition and indeed democratic institutions. Societies with lower levels of income inequality suffer less from social problems such as crime, mental diseases, obesity or teenager pregnancies (Wilkinson/Pickett 2010) . This suggests that also for the economically better off, more economic equality may be desirable as they also stand to benefit from a safer society with less crime and other social problems.
While there are multiple causes for inequality, one important cause consists in the ability of wealthier segments of societies to escape their tax obligations. By shifting financial assets and income offshore -that is, across borders, beyond the reach of their tax administrations -they can engage in tax evasion, which directly undermines both the progressive nature of income taxation and thus the bedrock of modern societies, and redistribution as one of the four key functions of taxes (Cobham 2007) . It also impacts the voluntary compliance of all other taxpayers because " [i] f taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, tax morale decreases" (Frey/Torgler 2007: 153) .
Tax havens -or more usefully, financial secrecy jurisdictions -have commercialised their sovereignty (Palan 2002) to provide a shield of secrecy for those seeking to hide their fortunes. By creating laws that invite financial institutions and service providers to receive, hold and manage the assets of nonresidents without providing information to the relevant home authorities, secrecy jurisdictions facilitate and incentivise the nondeclaration of assets, income and capital gains.
2 But the problem is not restricted anymore to notorious Caribbean or Alpine secrecy jurisdictions. Major financial centres such as the United States, the United Kingdom and its empire of overseas satellite jurisdictions as well as Germany all host substantial offshore assets and provide secrecy (Cobham et al. 2015; .
Given the widespread principle of worldwide income taxation rights in favour of the jurisdiction where individuals are resident, offshoring assets and income constitute illegal tax evasion as long as these assets and income are not declared in income tax returns to the relevant domestic tax administration. In practice, however, the laws underpinning this principle have hardly been enforced in practice because the risk of being caught for offshore tax evasion is extremely small, absent any third-party reporting obligations that work effectively across borders. Without routine reporting by third parties -e.g. by financial institutions reporting account balances of clients to the tax administrations -compliance with tax laws is likely to fall dramatically. A comprehensive study by the US Treasury's Internal Revenue Service (2012) analysed the tax gap for the United States -the differences of taxes due and the taxes actually paid. It allocated the amounts lost due to misreporting of income into categories of income sorted by the intensity of third party reporting. The results are striking: when income is subject to substantial information reporting (or high visibility or transparency), only between 1% and 8% of the amounts is misreported. However, if the income is subject to little or no information reporting (or little or no transparency), 56% of the income is misreported. This latter case is, of course, the context of international business and taxation. There has not been a functioning system for routine reporting across borders for the last decades.
These findings suggest that tax evasion of cross-border income is the rule, and not the exception, at least as long as no effective information reporting on that income is taking place. Other studies and experiences confirm this. For example, Gaggero (et al. 2007 ) estimate that 85% of wealth held abroad by 2 see Tax Justice Network's Financial Secrecy Index for a discussion of the full range of issues involved, e.g. www.financialsecrecyindex.com (Cobham et al. 2015; While the exact amounts at stake are necessarily uncertain given the hidden nature of these activities, there is no doubt that the resulting revenue losses are substantial. The lowest estimate of global financial wealth held 'offshore' is $7.6 trillion in 2013 (Zucman 2014) , the highest is $21-$32 trillion in 2010 (Henry 2012 (Meinzer 2015b: 50) . Given that interest income stemming from those assets would normally be taxable in Turkey 6 is unlikely to be reported and taxed, the amounts invested in the German financial system by Turkish residents imply a considerable revenue loss to Turkey. Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank 2013b , 2014b , 2013a , 2014a Meinzer 2015 ; own analysis. non-compliant banking groups with a hefty 30% withholding tax on all US source payments. However, FATCA did not entail the principle of reciprocity and therefore allowed the US to continue providing de facto banking secrecy to nonresidents investing in the US financial system. 13 In November 2011, it was India's prime minister Manmohan Singh who took the torch of frontrunner by openly calling for the G20 to embrace automatic information exchange: "The G20 countries should take the lead in agreeing to automatic exchange of tax related information with each other, irrespective of artificial distinctions such as past or present, for tax evasion or tax fraud, in the spirit of our London Summit that 'the era of bank secrecy is over'" 14 . Itai Grinberg, professor of Law at Georgetown University, in January 2012, published a paper in which he asserted: "The international tax system is in the midst of a novel contest between information reporting and anonymous withholding models for ensuring that states have the 
Current Challenges
As of January 2017, more than 100 jurisdictions have committed to join the CRS In Germany, the law implementing automatic information exchange pursuant to the respective Directive has been discussed in parliament during a public expert hearing on 2 November 2015 (Meinzer 2015a; Henn 2015) and was enacted on 21 December 2015 (Bundestag/Bundesrat 2015).
De facto exclusion of developing countries
The two major obstacles developing countries face when seeking to access information about their residents' offshore assets consist in the requirement of full reciprocal information exchange, and in the option for a "dating system". The latter allows major financial centres to engage in cherry picking, as they have announced to do. While the first problem could be overcome through capacity 28 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/MCAA-Signatories.pdf; 30.1.2017. 29 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-381_en.htm; 14.2.2017. 30 The CRS allows a country to treat trusts that are Passive Non-Financial Entities (NFEs) as if they were "reporting-Financial Institution trusts". While the former would have to report all beneficiaries, including discretionary beneficiaries, the latter is allowed not to report discretionary beneficiaries until they receive a distribution (OECD 2015b: 17) . In jurisdictions that are applying that option, discretionary beneficiaries will be reported only after receiving a distribution. Given that a "distribution" may be hidden as a loan (or other type of payment never to be repaid), the EU-Commission ruled out that option.
building, including through pilot projects (Knobel 2017a) , the other problem continues to act as an effective barrier to prevent developing countries from accessing urgently needed data about their tax residents.
In addition to the domestic legislation, the international legal framework that jurisdictions need for participating in the CRS consists of two elements. First, an international framework treaty or convention, and second, a competent authority agreement (CAA) with the specific jurisdiction in question and with a specific reference to the CRS. A combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches are possible. income. Similarly, the OECD has failed to openly discuss the USA's failure to engage in the CRS, and to explore ways of bringing the USA into the CRS.
How to incentivise recalcitrant jurisdictions to participate
In difference to the US FATCA law, the CRS does not contain any built in provision to incentivise financial institutions and/or jurisdictions to participate, such as a 30% withholding tax for US source payments FATCA is imposing on financial institutions that do not provide data under FATCA. As a result, initially, a number of jurisdictions did not commit to the CRS, such as Bahrain, Lebanon and Panama. In the meantime, however, all major secrecy jurisdictions have committed to the CRS standard except for the United States. In an OECD document listing all commitments, the only footnote states:
"The United States has indicated that it is undertaking automatic information exchanges pursuant to FATCA from 2015 and has entered into intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with other jurisdictions to do so. The Model 1A IGAs entered into by the United States acknowledge the need for the United States to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange with partner jurisdictions. They also include a political commitment to pursue the adoption of regulations and to advocate and support relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange."
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The IGA type 1A, which does contain some reciprocity and the political commitment to achieve full reciprocity, is the type of IGA signed by Germany and Turkey to implement AEoI pursuant to FATCA with the USA. The asymmetries in the levels of information exchanges are notable (see Despite the US commitment present in IGAs 1A (Article 6) to achieve full reciprocity, however, there is no timeframe and U.S. Congress has to approve the changes to achieve full reciprocity, as evidenced in a letter sent by the US
Secretary of the Treasury to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on 5
May 2016 (Lew 2016; Knobel 2016: 11) . Furthermore, the USA has only signed, but not ratified the Amended Tax Convention.
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The failure of the USA to participate in a level playing field for taxing offshore accounts has become the subject of media reporting and debate. 48 In order to incentivise US financial institutions and the US government to participate, and to increase the benefits for developing countries flowing from AEoI, Tax Justice Network (2016) has published a proposal in January 2016. It calls on the European Union to introduce a 30% withholding tax on all EUsourced payments to any financial institution based in a financial centre that is not sharing sufficient information with the EU, or with any "fit and ready" developing country. This proposal has been presented to the EU-Commission Expert Group on automatic exchange of financial account information on 6
November 2016. 49 
EU selfinterest
EU first (with 'fit' developing countries later)
As above. As any of the above. As any of the above.
US-EU
Source: Tax Justice Network 2016.
Implementation of the CRS -The Global Forum, Peer Reviews and Public Statistics
Setting aside the various omissions and loopholes present in the CRS (Knobel/Meinzer 2014b) , the Implementation Handbook (Knobel 2015) and the In the case of trusts, the CRS definitions go beyond FATF definitions and are more comprehensive. Nevertheless, because there are hardly any registers of trusts anywhere (Knobel/Meinzer 2016b ) and very few beneficial ownership registries for companies (e.g. the UK), it is impossible for financial institutions to cross-check for accuracy and truthfulness, the information they collect on beneficial owners. As regards "entity" account holders that are not considered "passive" but "active" (because their income is mostly stemming from business In the face of the risk for the new ToR to harbour considerable secrecy, and in the light of past failures in earlier peer review processes to provide the data needed for objective and independent evaluations (Meinzer 2012b: 20) , Tax
Justice Network has published a report with crucial issues that should be addressed by the future peer reviews for AEoI in order for them to objectively assess and document the CRS' effectiveness (Knobel/Meinzer forthcoming).
Many of the earlier analyses into the multiple loopholes suggest that detailed, public statistics by each jurisdiction are an indispensable part of any meaningful peer review of the implementation of the CRS. Jurisdictions that fail to annually provide comprehensive, comparable, detailed and robust statistics about the implementation of the CRS should automatically be treated as non-participating jurisdictions.
The only way to ensure the enforcement of the CRS is to have robust public statistics on the number and value of accounts that are being reported, and especially those which are excluded from reporting. By doing this, and comparing across jurisdictions, it will be possible to track compliance throughout the years, but also identify and alert on avoidance mechanisms, for example if there is an increase in values held by non-reporting financial institutions or by non-reportable accounts or non-reportable persons. Australia has already moved to require statistics about the CRS to be published. 
Conclusions
The advent of the Common Reporting Standard is a welcome and major breakthrough in the global fight against illicit financial flows and offshore tax evasion. Both exacerbate inequalities within and across nations and threaten the social fabric and the rule of law underpinning democratic societies and fair market competition. However, the CRS does not spell the end of offshore tax evasion and its lasting and transformative impact hinges upon a number of crucial, unresolved issues.
First, the effective bilateralism through voluntary choices of exchange partners under the guise of multilateralism run the risk of extending and shifting the problem of offshore tax evasion from OECD and G20 members to less powerful emerging economies and developing countries. The Global Forum peer reviews have the potential to address this issue by insisting on swiftly entering into CAAs with any interested parties, as long as basic confidentiality and human rights conditions are met.
Second, the USA's refusal to engage in CRS and its very limited reciprocity embedded in FATCA agreement IGA 1A risks undermining the global level playing field and needs urgently to be remedied. The European Union holds the key to bring the USA back into the international community by using its internal financial market and currency as a leverage to incentivise the USA to fully reciprocate and participate in the CRS.
Third, without public registries about the beneficial owners of companies, trusts and foundations, the reporting about the riskiest category of accounts -those held by passive NFEs -is unlikely to be effective. As the UK has shown, it is possible to advance unilaterally on that matter, and the EU is close to agreeing such mandatory central and public registries.
Fourth, the Global Forum has to potential of addressing a number of other crucial issues. Namely, it has to ensure that sanctions for non-compliance with the reporting obligations are not capped and include prison terms for wilful misreporting. And most importantly, it has the power to require detailed, yet aggregate public statistics about the information reporting on a country by country basis. That would enable robust evaluation of the quality of the information reporting, and build the confidence by the public and societies around the world that offshore tax evasion is not condoned any longer.
